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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The Appellant ("Burghart"), a pro se incarcerated inmate, appeals the district court's
Judgment and Order Granting Summary Judgment and dismissal of Burghart's Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Burghaii is a pres½ntly incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Coirection ("IDOC") by
virtue of a judgment of conviction and order of commitment. Burghaii is ctmently housed at the
Kit Carson CoITectional Center. Burghaii was convicted in 1998 and sentenced to five (5) years
fixed not to exceed twenty (20) years. Burghaii was denied parole following hearings before the
Parole Commission ("Commission") in March 2002 and August 2009.
Procedural History
Burghart filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 23, 2009. (R., Aug. p.
16.) 1 In his Petition Burgha1i made four claims:
(1) Given the statutory language "shall" in statue under Sass v. California
Par. Bd. 461 F3d 1123 and Martin vs. Marshall 448 FSupp 2 nd 1143 Petitioner has
a liberty interest in parole 5 th & 14 th Amendment.
(2) The parole board showed no evidence under the "some evidence" rule
guaranteed to prisoners in a disciplinary, which under Hill vs Superintendent,
some evidence applies to the parole context.
(3) State parole board would satisfy due process requirements in action on
petitioner's application when board conducts hearings, considers inmate's
circumstance, prior record, institutional record, future plans and advising their
reason denying application.
(4) The commission is arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional in their
activities is why the Co1Tections budget went from $25 million in 1985 when
Olivia Craven became director to $200 million now, because the parole board has
went unchecked.
1 Citation to the Clerk's Record filed on March 4, 2011, in appeal no. 38137 pursuant to the Order Augmenting
Record issued on September 10, 2012. (R., p. 159.)

(R., Aug. p. 18.)
The district court issued an Order Directing Response and Notice of Hearing on
December 29, 2009, directing that Respondents file a response within 60 days of the court's
order.

(R., Aug. p. 22.) The Respondents' filed their Response and Motion to Dismiss on

February 17, 2010. (R., Aug. pp. 26-35.) The Respondents' moved to dismiss the Petition for
Burghart's failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (R., Aug.
p. 26.)

Burgha1i filed a Reply to Respondents' Answer and Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus
on March 1, 2010. (R., Aug. pp. 36-39.)
The district court held a hearing on April 2, 2010.

(R., Aug. p. 40.)

Both pmiies

presented argument to the court. (Id., pp. 40-41.) The comi granted Burghart an additional l 0
days to supplement his Petition with paperwork regarding exhaustion ofremedies. (Id., p. 41.)
Burghart filed a Supplemental Attachment (Exhaustion) on April 7, 2010. (R., Aug. p.
46.) The Respondents' filed a Supplemental Response to Motion to Dismiss on April 12, 2010.
(R., Aug. pp. 42-44.)
The district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on June 1, 2010, granting
the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss m1d dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. (R., Aug. pp. 45-51.)
Burghart filed a Motion For Reconsideration and Motion to Leave to Amend Petition on
June 11, 2010.

(R., Aug. pp. 53-59.)

The Respondents' filed an Objection to Motion to

Reconsider and Motion to File Amended Petition on July 13, 2010. (R., Aug. pp. 60-64.)
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on August 16, 2010. (R.,
Aug. pp. 66-70.) The district court denied Burghart's motion to amend and motion to reconsider.
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(R., Aug. pp. 68-69.) Thereafter Burghart filed a Notice of Appeal on September 9, 2010. (R.,
Aug. pp. 77-81.)
The Comi of Appeals affo111ed the district court's decision that Petitioner failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as to Respondent Carlin. Burghart v. Carlin, 151 Idaho 730,
732,264 P.3d 71, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).
Finding the Petitioner's arguments unavailing, the Court of Appeals also affirmed the
district court's decision that the use of the word "shall" in Idaho Code Section 20-223(c) did not
constitute mandatory language creating a libe1iy interest in parole and, did not implicate due
process protections in parole proceedings. Id. at 733.

The Court of Appeals further stated

Petitioner's argument was frivolous. Id. at 732.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the Petitioner's argument that the denial of parole, in
the absence of new evidence not considered by the sentencing comi, constitutes "extending his
sentence." Id. at 733.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the district court inc01Tectly dismissed the Petition
for failing to state a claim that the Parole Commission ("Commission") lacked a rational basis
for the denial of parole, holding that the Petition contained sufficient allegations to withstand a
motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 734.
The Court of Appeals remanded to the district comi to deten11ine, whether there is a
rational basis for the Commission's decision to deny parole. Id. The Court of Appeals instructed
that a proceeding should be held where the Commission is allowed to "present evidence of any
factors supporting the denial of parole." Id. A Remittitur was issued by the Court of Appeals
on September 21, 2011.
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Burgha1i filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support for Summary
Judgment on September 30, 2011. (R., pp. 4-11.) Respondents filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on October 18, 2011. (R., p. 13.) The district court issued a Scheduling Order and
order for Hearing on October 28, 2011. (R., p. 15.)
Respondents filed a Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and Response to
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits on November 2, 2011. (R.,
pp. 18-56.) Burghart filed a Response to Respondents (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 17, 2011. (R., pp. 59-72.)
A telephonic hearing on the motions for summary judgment was held before the district
comi on December 2, 2011. (R., p. 80.) The district court issued an Order Granting Summary
Judgment on December 2, 2011. (R., p. 84.)
On April 18, 2012, Burghart filed a Motion to File Tardy Notice of Appeal of No Fault of
the Appellant and a supporting affidavit. (R., pp. 88-96.) A Notice of Appeal was filed on April
24, 2012. (R., p. 109.) On June 4, 2012, an Order Dismissing Appeal Without Prejudice was
issued by the Supreme Court because there had not been a final judgment and/or order entered in
the district comi. (R., p. 130.) On June 12, 2012, the district court issued an Order Dismissing
Petition for Habeas Corpus. (R., p. 131.) A Remittitur was issued by the Supreme Court on July
11, 2012, dismissing the appeal without prejudice. (R., p. 133).
On July 11, 2012, Burghart filed another Notice of Appeal. (R., p. 148.) An Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal was issued by the Supreme Comi on July 31, 2012. (R., p.
155.) On August 28, 2012, a Judgment was entered by the district comi denying and dismissing
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (R., p. 157).
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The conditional dismissal was withdrawn on September 4, 2012, and an Order
Augmenting Appeal by the Supreme Court was filed on September 10, 2012. (R., p. 159.) The
appeal proceedings were suspended by order of the Supreme Court on January 15, 2013, to allow
time for the court to mail a copy of the Clerk's Record to Burghart.
The Court ordered Burghart's brief to be filed by May 27, 2013. Burghart timely filed his
brief and the Respondents' brief was ordered clue by June 25, 2013. Respondents timely file this
response.

ISSUES
Burghart has asse1ied four issues on appeal as follows:
1.

In Petitioners
November 15,
standards as to
as is mandated
(1972). (sic)

Response to Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on
2011 in Petitioners asse1is protection from requirement to confom1 to
fonn of tenninology as would be expected from a professional Attorney
for Pro Se Litigants via U.S. Supreme Ct. in Haines Vs Kerner US. 519

2.

Idaho Statue "shall" not give Petitioner Libe1iy Interest in possibility of parole but rather
"shall" Language merely set fo1ih conditions which must be satisfied before prisoner
becomes eligible for parole. Due Process of Law. (sic)

3.

"Some Evidence must apply to rational basis in parole eligibility under due process
clause. (sic)

4.

Order Dismissing Petition for Habeas Corpus for reasons set f01ih[.J (sic)

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Was special consideration wan-anted due to Burghart's prose litigant status?

2.

Did the district comi abuse its discretion in granting the Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissing Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
finding that the Commission had a rational basis for denying Burghart parole?
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ARGUMENT
I.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATION \VAS NOT WARRANTED DUE TO BURGHART'S
PRO SE LITIGANT STATUS
A. Introduction
Burghart argues that he asserted in his Response to Respondents (sic) Motion for
Summary Judgment that the court give consideration to his pro se status in regards to form or
language in his motions consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case Haines v. Kerner. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 8.) It appears he is arguing that the district court's finding that he failed to provide
affidavits or evidence in support of his motion for summary judgment, or in his opposition to
State's motion for summary judgment was in error and that because of his prose status he should
not be held to the same evidentiary standards or requirements of the summary judgment process.
B. Standard of Review
Idaho courts have long held that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as those
represented by an attorney. As recently stated by the Supreme Court, "it is well-established that
courts will apply the same standards and rules whether or not a party is represented by an
attorney and that pro se litigants must follow the same rules, including the rules of procedure."

Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134, 1139 (2013) citing
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009) (citations and quotations
omitted); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005); Twin Falls Cnty. v.

Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, l 046 (2003).
C. Pro Se Litigants Are Held To The Same Standards As Those Represented By An Attorney.

Burghart relies upon Haines v. Kerner in support of his argument that he be given special
consideration due to his pro se status, which states pleadings drafted by a pro se complainant are
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held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Likewise, Idaho courts have held that
"access to justice is not premised on technical rules of pleading ... the character and nature of a
pleading is to be deten11ined from the substance of the facts therein alleged and not from what
the pleading may have been designated or called by the party." Hauschultz v. State, 143 Idaho
462, 466-67, 147 P.3d 94, 98-99 (Ct. App. 2006). However, any leniency or deference afforded
to pro se litigants does not apply to compliance with rules of procedure and evidence. See

Bettwieser, 154 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013).
I.R.C.P. Rule 56( e) clearly states that when opposing a motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the
paiiy's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." "Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to create
a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary mate1ials which show the allegation to be
false." Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362, 368 (1969). In

Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., the Comi of Appeals found that drawings and a letter
appended to the Plaintiffs brief were not "presented to the distiict court in a maimer cognizable by
Rule 56, l.R.C.P." Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co .. 116 Idaho 460, 463, 776 P.2d 469, 473
(Ct. App. 1989). Similarly, the exhibits Burghaii attached to his Response to Respondents (sic)
Motion for Sunm1ary Judgment were not suppmied by an affidavit or submitted in a manner
recognized by I.R.C.P. Rule 56, and therefore cannot be considered evidence.
In the Notice of Appeal filed on July 12, 2012, Burghmi asse1is that he considers his
Response to Respondents (sic) Motion with Exhibits to be the equivalent of an affidavit or statement
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of facts. (R., p. 150,

ii

5.) However, in his b1ief Burghart does not cite to any authority to support

this argument. The act of notarizing his response does not turn the response into an affidavit. Even if
Burghart's Response to Respondents (sic) Motion for Summary is considered by this Court to be an
affidavit, it fails to specify factually how the Commission failed to establish a rational basis for the
denial of his parole. Burghart states that the decision to deny him parole was based on inaccurate
infom1ation and false or no evidence, but he does not specify what that inaccurate infonnation was
or provide any evidence to prove it was inaccurate or false. (R., p. 150, 16.) "Where an affidavit
merely states conclusions and does not set out facts, such supporting affidavit is inadmissible to
show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,
508, 600 P. 2d 1387, 1390 (1979). See also Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,
730 P.2d 1005, 1006 (1986) (I.R.C.P. 56(e) contemplated flawed affidavits that are only conclusory
in nature and merely repeat allegations contained in a complaint without establishing specific facts
or refuting the evidence presented by the other party.)
Even as a pro se litigant, the burden is on Burghart to ensure the info1mation he presents to
the comi is done in a manner consistent with the rules of procedure to make the inforn1ation paii of
the record. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 821, 979 P.2d 1174, 1179 (1999). The distiict
comi was co1Tect to hold Burghaii to the same standai·d as litigants with attorneys and properly
detennined Burghmi failed to provide any evidence or affidavits in suppmi of his motion for
summary judgment or in opposition to Respondents' motion for summary judgment.

II I
II I
II I
II I
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II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSED BURGHART'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A.

Introduction
Burghart appeals the district court's Judgment and Order Granting Summary Judgment

and dismissal of Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the court.

Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127,376 P.2d 704, 706 (9162); Brennan v. State, 122 Idaho 911,
914, 841 P .2d 441, 444 (Ct. App. 1992). When the court reviews an exercise of discretion in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the court conducts a three-tiered inquiry to detem1ine whether the
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such
discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.; Sivak v. Ada County, 115 Idaho
762, 763, 769 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Ct. App. 1989).

If a petition is not entitled to relief on an

application for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision by the petitioned court to dismiss the
application without an evidentiary hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122 Idaho at 917, 841 P.2d
at 447.
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review utilized by this
Court is the same standard used by the dish·ict court in initially ruling on the motion.

M~endenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment is
to be rendered to the moving paiiy if all the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving paiiy is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In considering summary
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judgment the court liberally construes all facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 (2005).
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving paiiy may not rest
on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to
contradict the assertions of the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56( e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175,
176 (1974). A non-moving paiiy may not rely on general or conclusory allegations unsupported
by specific facts, pmiicularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise
uncontroverted facts.

Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997).

Rather, a party must

provide factual details of specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels and

Son v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 541 (1984). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as
to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary
judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, even
disputed .facts will not defeat summary judgment when the non-moving pmiy fails to establish
the existence of an essential element of his of her case, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102
( 1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case on which he or she bears the
burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P's/zip, 127 Idaho 267,270 (1955).
C.

The Commision Established a Rational Basis for Denial of Parole
In reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus to decide if the writ should issue and an

evidentiary hearing be held the court must treat all allegations contained in the petition as true.

A1ahajfey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964). In order for a court to have jurisdiction to
grant a writ of habeas corpus, it must appear a violation of constitutional rights has occurred. If,
after treating the allegations as true, the court finds that they do not state a constitutional claim,
the court must dismiss the petition without fmiher hearing. Mitchell v. Agents of the State, 105
Idaho 419, 670 P.2d 520 (1983). Although a petition for writ of habeas corpus differs somewhat
10

from a typical civil complaint, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do apply to habeas corpus
proceedings. Sivak v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 795 P.2 898 (Ct. App. 1990).
In this case the district court should look to draw all inferences in favor of Burghart and
seek to determine whether he has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which, if true,
would entitle him to relief, and whether he is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims.
As the following discussion will illustrate, even when all inferences are drawn in Petitioner's
favor, it was proper for the district comi to dismiss Burghaii's claim.
The issue before the district court on remand was whether there were sufficient facts
before the Commission to establish a rational basis to deny Burghaii parole at his August 6,
2009, parole hearing. Idaho's statutory parole scheme allows for parole only in the discretion of
the Commission. Vittone v. State, 114 Idaho 618, 619, 759 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1988); I.C. § 20223( c) ("A parole shall be ordered when, in the discretion of the commission, it is in the best
interests of society, and the commission believes the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the
obligations of a law-abiding citizen.") The Idaho courts have long recognized that parole "is a
gratuity which shall be ordered only for the best interest of society when the commission
reasonable believes that the prisoner no longer poses a threat to the safety of society, not as a
reward of clemency." Freeman v. State, 119 Idaho 692, 695-96, 809 P.2d 1171, 1174-75 (Ct.
App. 1991 ). "[T]he Conunission has sole power to dete1mine eligibility for parole." Mellinger v.

Idaho Dep 't. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 499 (Ct. App. 1988); IDAP A 50.01.01.250.01
("Parole detern1ination is at the complete discretion of the commission ... [and it] may release an
inmate to parole on or after the date of parole eligibility, or not at all.") In Drennon v. Craven,
this Court stated that the parole decisions of the Commission "often involve no more than
infonned predictions about what would best serve coITectional purposes or the i1m1ate's safety
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and welfare." Drennon v. Craven, 114 Idaho 34, 105, P.3d 694 (Ct. App. 2004) citing Vittone,
114 Idaho at 620, 759 P.2d at 911. In Freeman the court explained,
the decision whether to release a prisoner on parole depends on an
amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of
which are purely subjective appraisals by the decision-making
body, based upon the members' experience with the difficult and
sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.
Freeman at 696 citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 9-10, 99 S.Ct 2100, 2104-2105, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). "The denial of parole by the
Parole Commission need only be supp01ied by a rational basis in the record." Banks v. State,
128 Idaho 886, 888 ( 1996).
The district comi con-ectly deten11ined that the decision to grant or deny parole is within
the discretion of the Commission and stated "the court will not substitute its opinion for the
opinion of the parole commission as long as the commission had a rational basis for its
decision." (R., p. 86.) The scope ofreview of a commission decision is limited to:
[d]etern1ining whether the inforn1ation relied on by the Parole
Board was sufficient to provide a factual basis for the reasons
given. The inquiry is not whether the Board is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, or even by substantial evidence;
the inquiry is only whether there is a rational basis in the record for
the Board's conclusions embodied in its statement ofreasons.
Ybarra v. Dermitt, 104 Idaho 150, 151, 657 P.2d 14, 15 (1983) citing Zannino v. Arnold, 531
F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.1976). "The Commission allows for parole consideration criteria, but no
prediction regarding the granting of parole can be based upon any hearing standard or criteria."
IDAPA 50.01.01.250.01.c.

The commission considers (1) the seriousness and aggravation

and/or mitigation involved in the crime; (2) prior criminal history; (3) failure or success of prior
probation/parole; (4) institutional history, including conforn1ance to rules, involvement
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programs and jobs, custody level, and overall behavior; (5) evidence of the development of

12

positive social attitudes and willingness to fulfill obligations of a good citizen; (6)
infornrntion/reports regarding physical or psychological condition; and (7) strength and stability
of proposed parole plan, including adequate home placement, employment, or maintenance and
care. IDAPA 50.01.01.250.01.c(i)-(vii).
The district court found that the Commission appropriately exercised its discretion and
had a rational basis to deny parole based on the infom1ation provided to the Commission at the
2002 and 2009 parole hearings. The 2002 hearing minutes set forth the infonnation relied upon
by the Commission to deny Burghart parole. (R., pp. 40-41.) The district court identified the
offense committed by Burghart, the number of other victims of Burghart, his relationship to the
victims and families, his use of controlled substances, his high risk ofre-offending, the impact on
the victims, his enrollment in treatment programs, and his release plan as infonnation considered
by the Commission to establish a rational basis for its decision to deny Burghart parole in 2002.
(R., p. 85.) The district court identified similar information in the 2009 hearing minutes to

support a rational basis for the Commission's decision to deny parole:
1) The nature of the offense Burghaii was convicted of, which the
commissioners considered to be a honific crime against a minor, 2) that
Burghart had other victims, 3) that Burghart had a history of illegal drug
use, 4) that Burghart was in the Relapse Prevention class at the time of the
hearing and would like to complete the sex offender treatment program in
the near future, 5) Burghart's release plan (to live at Bethel Ministries in
Boise for up to 6 months and then find a place of his own, then look for
work and get into the SANE program, which he would follow up with
monthly therapy sessions, and eventually move back to Oregon), 6) that
Burghart abused his victim and another victim about 45 times over a 9 or
10 month time period, 7) that Burghart agreed that he is a violent
pedophile, and 8) the effect of Burghart's actions on two victims.

Id.
The district court found that these factors revealed that while Burghaii had taken some
steps towards rehabilitation, the "nature of the crime he was convicted of, the number of other
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victims, the "grooming" of his victims and the number of abusive incidents with his victims, and
the classification of Burghart as a violent pedophile" provided a rational basis upon which to
deny parole. (R., p. 86.) Furthermore, in Banks v. State, the court found that Banks' own
statements regarding the Commission's reliance upon allegations of other criminal activity
demonstrated a rational basis for denial of parole. Banks v. State, 128 Idaho 886, 889, 920 P.2d
905, 908 (1996). Burghart made similar statements in his Response to Respondents (sic) Motion
for Summary Judgment and stated the Commission's reliance upon the existence of other crimes
and other victims was prejudicial. (R., pp. 63-64.) Burghart stated, "[t]he Commission construes
Petitioners Attempt to be Honest and Open Regarding his past as Evidence of fmiher Crimes and
Victims ... " (R., p. 63.) In addition, Burghaii admitted at the 2009 parole hearing that he had four
(4) victims and "may have more" under the laws ofldaho and that he is a pedophile. (R., pp. 3637.) As the court found in Banks, Burghart himself identified a rational basis for the Commission
to deny him parole.
Based on the above, the district court did not en in granting the Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissing the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. There is no genuine
issue as to whether the Commission had a rational basis to deny Burghart's request for parole.

1. Burghart failed to provide any evidence in support of his argument that the
Commission did not have a rational basis to deny him parole.
In this appeal, Burghart has not presented any valid argument, evidence or citation to any
authority that the Commission did not have a rational basis to deny him parole. Burghart's
argument is based upon his asse1iion that the district comi ened by not considering the
documents he submitted with his Response to Respondents (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment
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and that the exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Olivia Craven should not have been considered
by the court. Appellcmt 's Brief, pp. 8, 10.
Neither in his Motion for Summary Judgment, nor in his Response to Respondents (sic)
Motion for Summary Judgment, did Burghart submit evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact to controvert the evidence submitted by Respondents and ultimately relied upon by
the district court. In his Response to Respondents (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment, Burghart
attached three (3) documents for consideration by the district court. These documents included a
letter dated March 5, 2003, regarding his progress in a Sex-Offender Therapy Group, a copy of
an order dismissing a wan-ant and charges pending against him in Oregon, and a copy of an
Access to Comis Request seeking access to the Tucker's Directory and a copy of research
materials available for his writ of habeas corpus petition. (R., pp. 67-72.)
As argued above, the district court properly did not consider these exhibits as evidence.
Even if the district comi ened by not accepting these documents as evidence, the enor is
hannless as these documents do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
Commission had a rational basis to deny Burghart parole. The 2009 parole hearing minutes show
that Burghmi infom1ed the Commission of his progress in treatment and his plans to continue
treatment in the community. (R., pp. 36-37.) Further, the district court acknowledged that
participation in treatment programs was infom1ation considered by the Commission in reaching
its decision. (R., p. 85.) As for the document showing a dismissal of an Oregon case involving
Burghart, there is a reference in the 2002 and 2009 parole hearing minutes to pending charges
against Burghart in Oregon and Montm1a. (R., pp. 37, 40.) However, the district court did not
identify the pending Oregon charges as infom1ation to support its finding that the Commission
had a rational basis to deny parole. (R., p. 85.) In addition, the record is silent as to the nature of
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the charges dismissed in Oregon and whether the dismissed charges are the same charges
referenced in the hearing minutes. The Access to Courts Request submitted by Burghart does not
provide any evidence or have any relevance as to the issue before the district court.
The record supports the district court's finding that Burghart did not submit any evidence
in support of his argument that the Commission did not have a rational basis to deny him parole.
2. The evidence submitted by State was properly considered by the district court
and sufficient to establish a rational basis to deny parole.

In support of Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondents submitted an
Affidavit of Olivia Craven, Executive Director for the Commission, and minutes from Burghart's
2002 and 2009 parole hearings. (R., pp. 31-42.) Despite this evidence, Burghart argues that the
Commission did not present sufficient evidence to establish a rational basis for its decision to
deny parole. (Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) Burghart presented two theories to support his argument.
First, Burghmi states that Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Olivia Craven should not be considered as
a true and conect copy of the 2009 parole hearing minutes because the minutes were not signed
by Ms. Craven. Id. As the Executive Director, Ms. Craven is authorized to designate somebody
to sign the minutes on her behalf. IDA.PA 50.01.01.100.04(a). As stated in her Affidavit, Ms.
Craven authorized Audrey Whitehurst to sign on Ms. Craven's behalf as approval of the 2009
hearing minutes and that the minutes are an "accurate summary of the hearing proceedings." (R.,
p. 32, il 3.) Burghart did not submit any evidence or cite to any authority to dispute Ms. Craven's
authority to approve hearing minutes by authorizing somebody to sign the minutes on her behalf,
nor did Burghart submit any evidence as to dispute the accuracy of the 2009 minutes. Second,
Burghart states that Exhibit B, the 2002 hearing minutes, should also not be considered because
while it was signed by Ms. Craven, it was not notarized. (Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) There is no
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requirement that the parole hearing minutes be notarized in order to be considered a true and
correct copy of the minutes from the hearing. Rule 100.04(a) of the Rules of the Commission of
Pardons and Parole only requires that the minutes from individual hearings be signed by the
appropriate party, not that the minutes be notarized. IDAPA 50.01.01.100. As exhibits to Ms.
Craven's sworn affidavit and infonnation for which she has personal knowledge of, Exhibit A
and Exhibit B were properly admitted and considered by the district comi.
Burghaii also argues that the Affidavit of K.rista Howard should not be considered valid.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10). This argument is moot as the district court stated that this affidavit
was not considered by the comi in its decision because it was not notarized. (R., p. 84.)

CONCLUSION
The Commission established a rational basis for denying Burghaii parole and the decision of
the district court must be upheld. Based on the foregoing reasons and well settled Idaho law, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissing Burghaii's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Accordingly,
Respondents respectfully request that the Court affinn the district court's order granting
summary judgment and dismissal of Burghart's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DATED this 25 th day of June, 2013.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/~~~-

KARIN MAGNELU
Deputy Attorney General
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